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‘ISLANDS OF EMPOWERMENT’: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE QUESTION
OF RACIAL EMANCIPATION
Faisal Bhabha*
In her evocative masterpiece, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, published in 1991,
Patricia Williams captured a moment in American legal thought that marked a turning
point in expressions about race and power, and the implications for social equality. It
contained lessons extending beyond America’s unique race history, to the general social
and political dynamics in liberal democracy that create conditions of privilege and
exclusion. She invited us to think about the place of law in the social and institutional
practices that sustain status quo hierarchies, despite proclaimed civil rights commitments
to justice. She also inspired hope that the role of the lawyer could be one of mutinous
agitator—struggling from the inside, using the tools and skills of practice to support the
causes of identifiable communities and social movements.
Dans son chef-d’œuvre évocateur, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, publié en 1991,
Patricia Williams a saisi un moment dans la pensée juridique américaine qui a marqué
un tournant au niveau des expressions concernant la race et le pouvoir, ainsi que les
répercussions pour l’égalité sociale. L’ouvrage contenait des leçons qui allaient au-delà
de l’histoire raciale unique des États-Unis et qui abordaient la dynamique sociale et
politique générale de la démocratie libérale qui crée des conditions de privilège et
d’exclusion. L’auteure nous a invités à examiner la place du droit dans les pratiques
sociales et institutionnelles qui maintiennent les hiérarchies du statu quo, malgré les
engagements en matière de droits civils qui ont été pris en faveur de la justice. Elle a
aussi laissé espérer que l’avocat pourrait jouer un rôle d’agitateur rebelle — luttant de
l’intérieur, en utilisant les outils et compétences pratiques pour soutenir les causes des
collectivités et des mouvements sociaux identifiables.
I. INTRODUCTION
In her evocative pièce de résistance, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, published in 1991,1 Patricia
Williams captured a moment of intensity in expressions about race and power in American legal
thought, and its implications for social equality. She exposed the pretensions of objectivity in law as
experienced by racial minorities, and challenged the rigid structures of legal doctrine, which she showed
reduce human experiences to too-neat categories and over-simplifications. She invited readers to think
*

1

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The author was a vice-chair with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
between 2008-2011. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone. He thanks Danielle Cornacchia for dependable
research assistance. He also thanks the organizers and participants in the symposium, Contemporary Accounts of
Racialization in Canada: Re-igniting Critical Race, held at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto in November 2012,
and in particular Patricia Williams for inspiring a rich day of discussion and reflection.
Patricia J Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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critically about rights in relation to the lingering racial privileges and unearned advantages that pervade
social relations, norms and institutions, including the teaching and practice of law. The insight from her
analysis extended beyond the context of America’s unique history with its black minority. It spoke to the
social and political dynamics at play in many liberal democracies, where conditions of privilege and
exclusion intersect with, or are driven by, the politics of racialization. Williams compelled us to think
about the place of law in the social and institutional practices that sustain structural inequality, despite
proclaimed civil rights commitments to social justice. She also inspired hope that the role of the lawyer
could be one of mutinous agitator—using knowledge, skills, creativity, experience and, when necessary,
defiance—to support the causes of those excluded from equal benefit and protection of the law.
With the enactment of civil rights legislation in the United States in the early 1960s,2 African
Americans gained a legal instrument with which to remedy their history of race-based exclusion.
Similarly, in Canada, the adoption of provincial and federal human rights statutes created processes for
investigating, adjudicating and vindicating claims of discrimination in a racial landscape that, from the
1960s onwards, would diversify as a result of liberalized federal immigration and multiculturalism
policies.3
In Ontario, the Human Rights Code turned 50 in 2012.4 The Code is premised on the notion that the
“inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”5 To this end, it promises that “every person has a
right to equal treatment,”6 “freedom from harassment”7 and freedom “from a sexual solicitation or
advance.”8 The Code also embraces the need for human rights legislation to combat systemic
discrimination.9 It supports positive action to counter structural inequality by creating the duty to
accommodate. It excuses “reverse discrimination” by justifying Code exceptions for affirmative action
measures. It makes available to tribunals remedial powers that go beyond what courts traditionally can
order.

2

3

4
5
6
7
8
9

“Civil rights” and “human rights” are distinct, though overlapping, concepts. In the United States, there is a longstanding
“[ideological] conception that human rights was something that happened outside of the United States, and civil rights is
what happened inside the United States”. See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et al, “Redefining Human Rights Lawyering
Through the Lens of Critical Theory: Lessons for Pedagogy and Practice” (2011) 18 Geo J on Poverty L & Pol’y 337 at
343-344. For the purposes of this article, the terms “human rights” and “civil rights” are used interchangeably to refer to
domestic statutes that prohibit race-based discrimination.
Historically, race relations in Canada were framed by the dual forces of settler-indigenous and English-French dynamics.
Amendments to the Immigration Act in 1967 removed significant entry barriers to people of colour, leading to Canada’s
emergence as the world’s first officially “multicultural” state in 1971. See Joseph E. Magnet, “Multiculturalism and
Collective Rights” (2005) 27 Sup Ct L Rev 431 at 440 [discussing the history of Canada’s multiculturalism policy].
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19 [Code].
Ibid, Preamble.
Ibid, ss 1, 2(1), 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6 (in the areas of goods, services, facilities, contracts, employment, vocational associations
and housing accommodations).
Ibid, ss 2(2), 5(2), 7(1), 7(2) (in the areas of accommodation and employment, including sexual harassment in those
areas).
Ibid, s 7(3) (by persons in authority).
Rosanna L Langer, Defining Rights and Wrongs: Bureaucracy, Human Rights and Public Accountability (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2007).
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The province also established the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), a body of human
rights experts to administer the Code.10 The mandate of the OHRC grew over the years and it quickly
became the primary gatekeeper of the human rights system, determining which cases deserved further
investigation. The OHRC also had the power to refer cases to a quasi-judicial tribunal for a
determination on the merits. By 2007, however, the pressure for reform—caused mainly by overload
and institutional lethargy—brought about statutory changes that removed the Commission from its
gatekeeping function.11 Under the revised human rights system, in place in Ontario since June 2008,
complainants may now bring cases directly to a dedicated tribunal, the Human Rights Tribunal of
Ontario (HRTO), which attracts in excess of 3,000 new cases of alleged discrimination and harassment
each year.12
For a long time, the most compelling critiques of human rights came from the legal left.13 Theoretical
and empirical work sought to show that rights adjudication does little to dismantle structures of
inequality,14 and can at times retard progress by forcing individualized claims and tying-up progressive
movements in lengthy, costly and ultimately disappointing litigation.15 In the US, for instance, research
on the lived impact of rights litigation led to findings that the gains of desegregation masked the
emergence of new, more insidious challenges, such as racial inequality in integrated schools.16 Some
argued that a controversial victory at the US Supreme Court in Roe17 had the effect of distorting political
debate on the subject of abortion and galvanizing the pro-life movement.18
Meanwhile, a vocal critique of rights also emanated from the political right. Critics voiced concern
about “anti-democratic”, judicially-driven rights reform efforts.19 This led defenders of rights to observe
that even successful rights adjudication can have adverse consequences by producing pushback from the
10
11
12
13

14

15
16

17
18
19

Originally, the OHRC’s mandate was to prevent discrimination through public education and policy work, as well as to
investigate complaints brought under the incipient Code. It later developed a mandate to pursue complaints to a hearing.
See Attorney General of Ontario, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 by Andrew Pinto (Toronto: Queens
Printer for Ontario, 2012) [“Pinto Report”] at 11-19.
Ibid at 40.
See Mark Tushnet, “An Essay on Rights” (1984) 62 Tex LRev 1363; Duncan Kennedy, “The Critique of Rights in
Critical Legal Studies”, in Brown & Halley, eds, Left Legalism/Left Critique (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2002).
See Nitya Duclos, “Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights Cases” (1993) 6 CJWL 25 at 30
[noting that “Human rights law is not—and cannot be—a complete remedy for racism and sexism. It addresses only
discrimination, which is generally understood to arise out of observable and relatively discrete acts of individuals.”
(emphasis added)]; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, “Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move
Forward” (2011) 43 Conn L Rev 1253 at 1262 [rights fail to meaningfully address the “institutional, structural and
ideological reproduction of racial hierarchy.”]
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2d ed (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008).
See Derrick Bell, “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation”
(1976) 85:4 Yale LJ (arguing that remedies championed by civil rights litigation, such as integrated schools, were failing
to improve the education of black children and were contrary to the wishes of many black communities that did not wish
to bus their children to white schools).
Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
See Cass R Sunstein, “Three Civil Rights Fallacies” (1991) 79 Cal L Rev 751 at 766.
See Robert H Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule Of Judges (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2003); FL Morton
and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2000).
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status quo, which in turn can have the effect of reducing the overall value of the litigation. According to
this theory, these diminishing returns on rights are caused by the baggage that is brought to the progress
the litigation seeks to achieve.20 As a result of these perceived risks and dilemmas, rights scholars began
to lament “tragic rights”21 and “rights gone wrong,”22 while others attempted to assemble the silver
linings of “winning through losing.”23
There seems little doubt that the stated aspirations of human rights are broader and more elusive than
the actual potential that statutory rights offer for promoting substantive equality. In Ontario, the goal of
the Code is to create “a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each
person so that each person feels a part of the community.”24 Achieving that goal likely requires more
than the mechanisms created by the Code can achieve beyond individual cases: it requires changes in the
economic order and distribution of resources that are beyond its scope,25 and changes to the dominant
cultural values and social norms, which require longer term strategies. However, legal rights can
perform other, often overlooked, functions. Williams describes rights as powerful rhetorical devices,
leading to positive psychic and communally meaningful outcomes, such as vindication, legitimation and
truth-telling with respect to discrimination and its underlying causes. Thus, both critiques of rights—of
limited potential and of backlash-producing pyrrhic victories—risk exaggerating the pitfalls and
obscuring the gains that rights afford. As Susan Carle writes, “Such broad conclusions lead to a state of
apathy or resignation worse than a failed experiment.”26
The theoretical insights of critical race studies inform two assertions that frame this article’s
commentary on the dilemma of false hope and the threat of backlash with respect to human rights: first,
critical race theory has persuasively affirmed that affected individuals’ and communities’ subjective
experiences with the law is an important source of knowledge that is required for a full and just
application of law to facts, especially when adjudication occurs in a racialized context;27 and secondly,
critical race scholars have urged a position of pragmatism when members of disadvantaged groups
consider resorting to litigating rights to advance a justice claim.28 The critical race movement has
continued to support the use of legal rights to advance social and political objectives, while at the same
time remaining realistic about the limits of “liberal reform” within existing structures.
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28

See Michael Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013) [Klarman, From the Closet] at 165-183.
Robin West, “Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama” (2011) 53 Wm & Mary L Rev 713.
Richard Thompson Ford, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law Corrupts the Struggle for Equality (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011).
Douglas NeJaime, “Winning Through Losing” (2010) 96 Iowa L Rev 941.
Code, supra note 4, Preamble.
See Thompson Ford, supra note 22 at 143 [arguing that courts erred in defining racial equality under civil rights statutes
as the elimination of dignitary harm, like “stigmatic injury, stereotypes and subjective emotional harm,” rather than
focusing on “economic justice and the tangible evils of the American racial hierarchy.”]
Susan D Carle, “How Myth-Busting About the Historical Goals of Civil Rights Activism Can Illuminate Future Paths”
(2011) 7 Stan J Civ Rts & Civ Liberties 167 at 194.
See Williams, supra note 1 at 220.
Richard Delgado, “The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want” (1987) 22 Harv CRCLL Rev 301 at 304-306 [describing the importance of structured rights for society’s most disadvantaged members who
otherwise wield little to no power].
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This article explores these themes in the light of the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Peel
Law Association v. Pieters.29 In that case, a unanimous court endorsed a contextually nuanced treatment
of evidence by the HRTO. The tribunal decision named anti-black racism as a social distortion that
unconsciously affects individual behaviour and seeps into actions that may appear to be nondiscriminatory but which are experienced as discrimination by those affected. This “fact” of unconscious
bias formed the basis for the adjudicator to infer a racial motive on the part of the perpetrator, despite the
absence of traditional, “hard” evidence. Pieters and related cases illustrate how unconscious racial bias
has been accepted as a basis for determining issues of liability for discrimination under statutory human
rights. These cases build on two decades of criminal law jurisprudence recognizing unconscious bias as
a factor at play in law enforcement.
This article also considers the rise of human rights scepticism as a counterweight to the assumption
that society follows the lead of the law when it comes to recognizing rights. By exploring select
doctrinal developments and public commentary, this article suggests that, rather than being cause for
alarm and retreat of the rights agenda, what is characterized as “backlash” may in fact be part of a longer
process of attitude and norm shifting. In the final analysis, the article returns to Williams’ account of
legal rights offering “islands of empowerment” amid conditions of pervasive racial disadvantage. It
concludes that maintaining a pragmatic commitment to rights allows for the instrumental use of
litigation, tempered by a critical view of underlying social conditions that structurally impede the
capacity of the law to fully realize the goal of racial emancipation.30
II. THE CASE OF THE BLACK LAWYERS
One day in May 2008, Selwyn Pieters, a dreadlocked, black lawyer, and his two black, male
colleagues appeared in a Brampton, Ontario courthouse. While taking a break in the lawyers’ lounge,
operated by the Peel Law Association, they were approached hastily by the courthouse librarian. The
rules of the lounge provided that only lawyers and law students were permitted to use the lounge.
Interrupting Pieters, who was on the phone, the librarian demanded to see proof that he and his
colleagues were entitled to be in the lounge. She told him that “paralegals” are not allowed. There were
about 20 people in the lounge at the time, but the white librarian asked only the three black men to
produce identification to establish that they were lawyers.31 Pieters accused the librarian of racial
profiling.
Pieters, along with one of his associates, Brian Noble, commenced a proceeding under the Code
alleging discrimination in the provision of services, goods and facilities by the Association. The men
claimed that their race and colour was a factor in the librarian’s decision to approach and question them
in the manner that she did. They believed they had been racially profiled. The case went to a hearing
before the HRTO, where several witnesses testified as to what occurred that day. While their stories

29
30
31

2013 ONCA 396 (CanLII) [Pieters], rev’g 2012 ONSC 1048 (CanLII) (Div Ct) [Pieters, Div Ct], aff’g 2010 HRTO
2411 (CanLII) [Pieters, HRTO].
In the interest of clarity, my use of the phrase “racial emancipation” can be defined as the process of liberation from
legal, social or political burdens or exclusions based on race, ethnicity or colour amid conditions of white privilege.
Pieters, HRTO, supra note 29 at paras 5-16. These facts were found by the Tribunal and accepted on appeal.
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were far from concordant, the HRTO assessed credibility and pieced together the most likely account of
the facts.32
The adjudicator accepted that the librarian had entered the lounge without any intention to check
identities, but that, upon noticing the men, decided spontaneously to approach them. The mindset of the
librarian was key to the HRTO’s factual findings and determinative of the ultimate legal conclusions.
Why did she approach these men, and only these men? From the perspective of the black men, it was
abundantly clear: she was motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by anti-black stereotypes. The men
testified that in their daily lives they routinely faced the assumption that black men are not likely to be
lawyers, and that they cannot be trusted. The librarian testified that the only reason she asked the men
for identification was because she did not recognize them personally—not because of an assumption
about their race.
The HRTO accepted that the librarian “regularly asked persons to confirm whether they were
lawyers, articling students or students of law in order to determine whether they were admissible to the
lounge and library.”33 The adjudicator also accepted that there were other individuals in the lounge at
that time who were not black and who the librarian did not personally know.34 The evidence was that
she focused her attention on the black men and not on the others. This fact, and the absence of a
plausible alternative explanation, led the adjudicator to infer the conclusion that the men’s race had been
a factor in attracting the librarian’s attention.35
While the HRTO found the librarian lacked credibility in explaining why she focused her attention on
the black men, the adjudicator accepted the librarian’s testimony that when she was confronted with the
accusation of racial profiling, she was hurt and visibly shaken:
I accept the personal respondent’s testimony that the allegation that she was racially profiling the
applicants shook her and that it affected her subsequent actions. Her testimony about the numbing effect
it had on her, that she felt overwhelmed, and that she determined that she had to focus her attention
specifically on Mr. Pieters, was emotional, detailed, forthright, and persuasive on this point.36

The librarian was sincerely hurt by the accusation that she was racially profiling the black lawyers. For
an accusation to sting, one might think it must have some air of subjective truth. A truly ludicrous
accusation would simply be dismissed and corrected. But, then again, some accusations are so serious
that they are received as an attack and they can cause emotional injury, even if the accusation is untrue;
perhaps especially if the accusation is untrue. Indeed, the manifest sincerity of the librarian’s shock
might reveal that she could not possibly have harboured any bias towards the black lawyers. On the
other hand, it might illustrate that the bias was present but was so embedded in her unconscious mind
that it was completely unknown to her. The latter is what the HRTO concluded: despite the librarian’s
sincere ignorance of her own racial bias, the evidence supported the inference that she was influenced, at
least in part, by unconscious racism.
32
33
34
35
36

Ibid at para 4.
Ibid at para 30.
Ibid at paras 79-80.
Ibid at para 84.
Ibid at para 78.
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III. UNCONSCIOUS RACISM: NAMING THE INVISIBLE (BUT HEAVY) HAND37
Critical race scholars have long described and theorized the experience of racial discrimination at the
hands of unwitting perpetrators. Recounting “ordinary”, every-day incidences of racism, such accounts
do not involve slurs or explicit exclusions of the sort that gave rise to the human rights imperative in the
first place. Today, racism operates mostly invisibly in societies like Canada, where overt racial
discrimination earns widespread public opprobrium and public values of tolerance are widely expressed.
However, for those like Pieters and Williams, who implicitly understand when their race affects how
others treat them, unconscious bias is present and influential in society. It leads to behaviour that
exhibits or produces racial discrimination, which can have a meaningfully adverse impact on individuals
and communities.38 Concerning the intention or mindset, the person exhibiting the discriminatory
behaviour does not necessarily need to plan or desire to cause a racially adverse outcome. But at the
same time, the discriminatory outcome is not detached from the values, priorities and assumptions of the
person exhibiting the behaviour. Thus, while the bias is not present in the mind of the individual, it is
embedded within the person. Unconscious racial bias “is rooted in unstated assumptions and values and
can influence one’s “beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions… . [A]
large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation.”39
The most evident illustration of unconscious racial bias can be found in the context of racially
disparate law enforcement practices.40 According to Stribopoulos, the moment of decision, when police
exercise their discretion to arrest, is when minorities are most vulnerable to racial discrimination:
No doubt some police officers hold overtly racist views that may lead them to abuse their arrest powers.
Much more likely, however, is the risk that many more police officers subconsciously operate on the
basis of stereotypical assumptions regarding visible minorities. An officer's assessment of her or his
grounds for an arrest may be partially skewed by a belief that certain visible minorities are more likely
to commit crimes.41

37

38

39
40

41

This very loose appropriation of the economics metaphor of an ever-present, but invisible, self-regulating force exerted
in the behaviour of markets captures the contested notion that racism in whatever form it takes can maximize its object
(discrimination, not wealth) if left unchecked by government intervention. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
(London: W Strahan and T Cadell, 1776).
See Williams, supra note 1 at 44-51 [describing being excluded from a Benetton store while Christmas shopping, and
subsequently writing about it despite her editors’ refusal to see race as an issue: “All reference to my race had been
eliminated because it was against ‘editorial policy’ to permit descriptions of physiognomy .... In a telephone conversation
to them, I ranted wildly about the significance of such an omission. ‘It's irrelevant,’ another editor explained .... ‘It's nice
and poetic,’ but it doesn't ‘advance the discussion of any principle .... This is a law review, after all.’”]
Charles R Lawrence III, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism” (1987) 39 Stan L
Rev 317 at 322.
See David Tanovich, “Moving Beyond ‘Driving While Black:’ Race, Suspect Description and Selection” (2004 - 2005)
36 Ottawa L Rev 315 at 320 (Noting the pervasiveness of overt and unconscious bias in policing: “We need to ask
ourselves whether we are satisfied that the remnants of overt racism are no longer present. We also need to be cognizant
of systemic or unintentional racism.”)
James Stribopoulos, “Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill LJ
225 at 250.
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In Nassiah v. Peel Regional Police,42 a case decided by the HRTO three years prior to Pieters, the
HRTO recognized the prevalence of police bias, and situated it within the broader social context. The
tribunal decision, which was never reviewed by a superior court, heavily coloured the Court of Appeal’s
treatment of the facts in Pieters. The facts of Nassiah stemmed from an incident in which the police
were called to apprehend a suspected shoplifter at a large department store in Mississauga, a diverse
suburban hub near Toronto.43 The suspect, a black woman who spoke foreign-accented English, had
been wrongly suspected of theft by store security. Despite the woman’s insistent denials and no proof
that she had stolen anything, the police pursued an investigation on the basis of the unfounded suspicion
of the white security officer. The HRTO found that the white male police officer began his investigation
with discriminatory assumptions: that the black suspect might not speak English, that she was not
truthful and that she was guilty.44 The officer’s behaviour in conducting the search also betrayed his
discriminatory mindset. He ignored videotape evidence exonerating the suspect and ordered two body
searches that yielded nothing but humiliation for the victimized woman.
That the investigation was excessive and ill-conceived was clear on the facts. That the item the
woman was accused of stealing was worth less than $10 made the police officer’s relentless pursuit
appear to be more than over-zealous law enforcement; his disregard for evidence more than
incompetence. Looking behind the officer’s stated motives and actions, the adjudicator relied on expert
evidence to accept as fact that, “statistically, racial minorities, particularly Black persons, are subject to
a higher level of suspicion by police because of race, often coupled with other factors.”45 The HRTO
went on to describe three causes of racial profiling: overt racism, meaning that some officers will
deliberately single out racial minorities and treat them more harshly; efficiency, by which police use
information about crime prevalence and certain minority groups to target members of those groups; and,
finally, unconscious bias.46 Explaining this last source of racial profiling, the adjudicator concluded that
“police officers, like all members of society, develop unconscious stereotypes about racial groups and
subconsciously act on those stereotypes during routine police investigations.”47

42
43

44
45
46
47

Nassiah v Peel (Regional Municipality) Services Board, 2007 HRTO 14 (CanLII) [Nassiah].
Nearly half of the population of the city of Mississauga is non-white, and nearly half do not speak English as a first
language. See Statistics Canada, Focus on Geography Series, 2011 Census: Census Subdivision of Mississauga, CY –
Ontario (Ottawa: StatCan, 2012), online: <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-csdeng.cfm?LANG=Eng&GK=CSD&GC=3521005> (In 2011, 47.6% of the population reported English as mother tongue,
47.0% reported a non-official language. In 2006, the ethnic breakdown was an even 50/50 split between whites and nonwhites).
Nassiah, supra note 42 at paras 75, 85.
Ibid at para 126.
Ibid at paras 127-128.
Ibid at para 129 (emphasis added).
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IV. “WE ARE ALL RACISTS”48
In Pieters, the HRTO referred to the findings in Nassiah, the suspected shoplifting case, to infer in
the absence of a plausible explanation from the librarian that she, like “police officers” and “all
members of society,” was acting on “unconscious stereotypes about racial groups.”49 The Association
disagreed and sought judicial review of the HRTO’s decision in Divisional Court. It argued that there
had been no actual evidence of discrimination for the HRTO to reach its conclusion and that the
adjudicator had applied an incorrect test that put the librarian in the position of having to explain how
her neutral behaviour was not racist.50 The reviewing court agreed with the Association and found that
by “improperly reversing the burden of proof, the Tribunal placed her in the difficult position of trying
to prove a negative, namely, that her conduct in the performance of her routine duties was not motivated
by race and colour.”51 The Court went on to reason that the adjudicator had erred in relying on Nassiah
to infer a nexus between the black lawyers’ race and their treatment by the librarian.52 The court held
that the difference between a librarian’s routine duties and those of a police officer are too “significant”
to warrant drawing parallels.53
At the Court of Appeal, the Association argued not only that the facts of Nassiah were
distinguishable, but additionally that it was improper as a matter of law for the HRTO to rely on any
expert evidence that was not called in the instant case. The Court agreed that the HRTO must be careful
when considering evidence that is not directly before the trier of fact but that the “resort to Nassiah was
of no material consequence to [the] decision.”54 The Court focused on the purpose for which the
evidence was canvassed. The Court began by stating that the adjudicator had actually drawn two
inferences about the librarian’s conduct. First, the adjudicator found (without resort to the Nassiah
evidence) that race had been one of the factors that had influenced the librarian to question the men in
the first place. Only after drawing this inference from the evidence it heard, the adjudicator turned to the
Nassiah expert evidence to highlight that race is often not only a factor in a decision to investigate, but
also a factor in the manner of investigation. This evidence lent support to the HRTO’s second inference
that the “the way in which [the librarian] interacted with the applicants was tainted by consideration of
their race and colour.”55 The Court held that the first inference addressed the main issue in the case: that
48

49
50
51
52

53
54
55

Lawrence, supra note 39 at 322 [emphasis added]:
[We Americans] share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a
dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that
attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent
that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware
of our racism.
Nassiah, supra note 42 at para 129. See also Pieters, HRTO, supra note 29 at para 91.
Pieters, Div Ct, supra note 29 at paras 34-35.
Ibid at para 37.
Ibid at para 43. Justice Chapnik opined:
While police have authority, power and control over citizens, Ms. Firth is a librarian, employed to provide library
services to lawyers, and she had no legal authority or power to detain, pursue or investigate the complainants. I
agree with the applicants that the reliance by the Vice-Chair on law enforcement cases was misconceived.
Ibid at para 41.
Pieters, supra note 29 at para 124.
Ibid at para 119.
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is, whether the decision to stop and question the black lawyers was discriminatory. The “aggressive”
manner in which the librarian questioned the lawyers was a secondary issue of discrimination that
simply confirmed the primary discriminatory action.
The Court went on to accept as a “sociological fact” that “racial stereotyping will usually be the result
of subtle unconscious beliefs, biases and prejudices.”56 This offered further context for drawing the
inference of bias, bolstering the reasonableness of the HRTO’s finding. The Court cited Justice
Doherty’s description of unconscious bias in R v. Parks: “Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is
a part of our community’s psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A
much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes.”57 The Court
also noted the adoption of this passage by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. S.(R.D.).58 In that case,
the highest court upheld the reasoning of a black Nova Scotian trial judge, whose characterization of
anti-black racism as “the prevalent attitude of the day” led her to doubt the credibility of a white police
officer accused of racially profiling a young black male.59
Thus, on the one hand, the law recognizes that a large number of Canadians operate on the basis of
racial stereotypes. However, proving such behaviour “objectively” in specific circumstances, and in the
absence of explicit admissions, remains a challenge. Williams describes this tension between the
objectivity of the law and the truths about minorities’ experiences with racial bias as a primary source of
the law’s alienating tendencies. We can see that, when the law privileges an “objectivist” theory of truth,
it necessarily mutes powerful subjective experiences with discriminatory impact.60 This highlights an
“implicit contrast between those whose self-believed stories are officially approved, accepted,
transformed into fact, and those whose self-believed stories are officially distrusted, rejected, found to
be untrue, or perhaps not heard at all.”61 The rigidity in traditional legal methodology “destabilizes the
very stability that ought to inhere in [the conventional] disciplining and methodical approach to textual
analysis and legal methodology.”62 By destabilizing conventional legal methodology, one can see
openings for alternative, and more broadly truthful, renderings of the facts in human rights litigation.
To this end, Williams urges us to re-think “truth” and “facts” as “rhetorical gestures”, in order to shift
what is considered normal and natural within law’s purview.63 Doing this can highlight the normative
biases and blind spots that underlie traditional approaches to legal truth and knowledge. It also exposes
the asymmetrical social and economic structures that formally limit the ability of legal process to
account for all of the relevant considerations when race is an issue and that create distortions in fact56
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Ibid at paras 111-113.
Ibid at para 113, citing R v Parks (1993), 15 OR (3d) 324 at para 54, 84 CCC (3d) 353 (CA).
Pieters, supra note 29 at para 114, citing R v S(RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 46 [RDS], 151 DLR (4th) 193.
RDS, ibid at para 4. The question was whether the trial judge reached her decision fairly, resting her ruling on the
evidence or on “something else” (ibid at para 3).
Kim Lane Scheppele, “Foreword: Telling Stories” (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2073 at 2088-2089 [“The objectivist theory of
truth holds that there is a single neutral description of each event which has a privileged position over all other accounts.
This single, neutral description is privileged because it is objective, and it is objective because it is not skewed by any
particular point of view.]
Ibid at 2089.
Reginald Leamon Robinson, “Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self” (1996) 40 How LJ
1 at 122.
Williams, supra note 1 at 10.

Vol. 31(2)

Anti-Discrimination Law and the Question of Racial Emancipation

75

finding. For Williams, changing “objective truth” into a rhetorical move disrupts established frames that
exclude minorities’ realities, and enables “a more nuanced sense of legal and social responsibility.”64
This enhances the pursuit of a clearer truth “because much of what is spoken in so-called objective
unmediated voices is in fact mired in hidden subjectivities and unexamined claims… .”65 Thus, if we
accept that objective truth in the context of the law’s structuring of interests is rooted in non-universal
subjectivities that are rarely questioned, then the goal of making law both more inclusive and more
aligned with reality requires integrating additional subjectivities into its forms and practices.
For some, this might be seen to create problems of indeterminate claims, unverifiable evidence and
unpredictability in legal outcomes, and attendant concerns about procedural fairness. If most Canadians
harbouring bias act unconsciously on racial stereotypes, the task of identifying the facts will be most
important in discrimination litigation, and will often depend on interpreting between the lines. “Who did
what, to whom, and why?” are the critical questions. This also raises practical challenges. How should
employers, public officials and everyday people be expected to comply with the prohibition on
discrimination if their behaviours can be dictated unwittingly by bias? In this reality, virtually anyone
could be accused of racial discrimination; what is more, one cannot eliminate the risk because no one
can know for certain whether one is infected with racial bias or how it will manifest. In the wake of
Pieters, the Peel County Law Association may be in no better position of knowing how to manage its
risk of human rights litigation than it was before the incident giving rise to the case. How does this
advance the cause of social transformation and racial justice?
In the result, the courts and tribunals are left to decide on a case-by-case basis. If an allegation of
discrimination is upheld, the respondent is “outed” and their unconscious bias is confirmed and declared
for all to see. If the claim is denied, the respondent has attracted stigma and expended considerable
energy and resources defending their name, and neither they, society, nor the aggrieved person is any
better off. In effect, when unconscious racism is identified and upheld at adjudication, the decision will
often speak more to general truths than to a particular truth, yet the remedies do little to address
underlying causes. Such decisions, if taken seriously, do imply collective guilt, and point the finger at
members of non-racialized communities to confront and assume responsibility for their own
unconscious prejudices.66 Taking responsibility for eradicating the underlying causes of racial
discrimination begins with this shared mea culpa.
V. TRANSFORMATION AND BACKLASH
In RDS, the Supreme Court split 6-3 on the question of racial bias. That case arose after a 15 year-old
black male was charged with interfering in the arrest of his friend and assaulting a police officer. The
officer and the boy told very different versions of the story. The trial judge, a black woman, acquitted
the boy after failing to be persuaded by the officer. She found that “police officers have been known to
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Ibid at 11.
Ibid.
This phenomenon has, at times, been referred to as “reverse stereotyping.” See e.g. Monica Biernat, “Toward a Broader
View of Social Stereotyping” (2003) 58:12 American Psychologist 1019.
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[mislead the court] in the past” and that “police officers do overreact, particularly when they are dealing
with non-white groups.”67
For members of racial minority groups across the country—especially African Canadians—the RDS
decision was a key moment of judicial truth-telling. The black trial judge’s approach to race and
policing engaged differently with the law’s aspiration to “blind justice.” Her judgment introduced the
black experience into the background facts of legal decision-making. In this respect, the trial judge was
phenomenological in her approach to fact finding.68 She heard the evidence—the “he said, she said”—
and moved between what was stated and what was not, and between the subjective and the objective, to
unearth a different form of truth from what the law normally recognizes. This truth was constructed not
only by the evidence adduced, but also by the judge’s experience with the evidence and with the world.
Rather than viewing this as corrupting the trier of fact’s judgment, the trial judge’s phenomenological
approach was ultimately vindicated at the Supreme Court of Canada.69
While a majority of the Court accepted the trial judge’s approach to hearing the evidence and
deciding the racial question, the minority concluded that it was the trial judge, not the police officer,
who was drawing racial assumptions. Justice Major (joined by Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. in dissent)
chastised the judge for “stereotyping all police officers as liars and racists” and for improperly applying
“this stereotype to the police officer in the present case… .”70 The dissent concluded as follows:
Whether racism exists in our society is not the issue. The issue is whether there was evidence before the
court upon which to base a finding that this particular police officer’s actions were motivated by racism.
There was no evidence of this presented at the trial.71

The deep split at the Supreme Court of Canada in RDS epitomizes the problem of identifying the
manifestations of racial discrimination within an adjudication framework. How the facts will be
established depends on the normative lens applied by the trier of fact. If the trier of fact accepts that
racism exists, is pervasive and embedded in society, this will lead to a different interpretation of
evidence than if the trier of fact begins from an assumption of race-neutral social conditions. While most
may agree that racism exists in society, how racism manifests, when and by whom, is deeply contested.
Important judicial pronouncements, sometimes in majority and sometimes in dissent, are paying heed to
the emanating effects of historical, deeply socialized and institutionalized forms of racism that continue
to infect social relations and lead to individual acts of discrimination.72 In a recent case before Ontario’s
Law Society Appeal Tribunal involving the disbarment of a black lawyer for professional misconduct,
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RDS, supra note 58 at para 5.
See Peter Gabel, “The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves” (1984) 62 Tex L
Rev 1563 at 1563-1564 [Defining the phenomenological method as the “effort to critically reexperience the phenomena
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our social experience becomes apparent the moment we try to grasp what ‘the law’ actually is.”] For the phenomenology
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J Legal Educ 518.
RDS, supra note 58.
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the panel of benchers split 3 to 2 over whether the effects of systemic racism should substantially
mitigate the penalty. The majority extended a touch of clemency and allowed the lawyer to relinquish
his licence rather than be disbarred. The two dissenters would have given him a second chance. Their
dissent made ample reference to the history and impact of racism in the legal profession:
The research into Canadian legal history shows that systemic racism has had a substantial impact on the
legal profession… Those who succeeded in obtaining entry found that those barriers continued to
impact upon their careers when they attempted to practise. Significantly, an increased risk of disbarment
was one such barrier for racialized lawyers.
It would be misguided to be aware of this history and yet ignore its contemporary incarnations simply
because the legal profession has today become much more diverse. The legal profession has made no
concerted effort to rid itself of the racism inherent in the practice. As the evidence in this case illustrates,
racialized lawyers continue to face barriers not experienced by their colleagues.73

It is notable that courts and tribunals are slowly but surely picking up the threads of RDS and have
begun to stitch a jurisprudence that accounts for diverse subjective perspectives that are usually
dismissed as irrelevant or unsubstantiated by conventional legal process. Racialized persons subjectively
know, and implicitly understand, when they are experiencing the effects of bias.74 Yet, there is rarely a
“gotcha” moment: direct evidence confirming the racialized person’s experience with discrimination is
not self-revealing. It must be extracted, inferred and assembled. Closets must be emptied.
Not surprisingly, when a person alleges racial discrimination, the named offender feels accused of a
terrible wrong. The accusation cuts deeper than other comparable forms of legal action. The label
“alleged racist” carries a stigma that delivers a more stinging bite than a law suit for breach of contract
or negligence. The accusation of discrimination itself has come to be seen as a form of smear and insult.
What is worse is that the respondent will continue to feel misunderstood, genuinely failing to see the
discriminatory conduct. This was evidenced in the librarian’s testimony in the Pieters case and in the
Association’s strident defence of her motives, behaviour and character. According to one intervener:
“Few claims can bring greater public opprobrium than being labelled a racist or found to have
discriminated against a member of a protected group.”75
Beyond the insult and stigma, critics also argue that the ease of access for complainants and flexible
procedures at tribunals have created unfairness to respondents, holding them hostage to a skewed
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process.76 Such critics have at times described Commission investigations as fishing expeditions77 and
tribunal hearings as “kangaroo courts.”78 Certainly, the statutory systems that handle complaints of
discrimination have been designed with an explicit access to justice mandate and subject matter
expertise. Rather than burdening generalist courts with highly contextual, fact-driven trials to identify
discrimination, the Supreme Court of Canada decided more than 30 years ago that there is no tort of
discrimination justiciable in the courts.79 Legislatures across the country have overwhelmingly embraced
statutory human rights and administrative procedures as the preferred manner for managing claims of
discrimination.80
Yet, while one may consider specialized tribunals with expert members trained in human rights
investigation and analysis to be an institutional strength, there has been a considerable effort to discredit
human rights institutions.81 Resistance to civil rights statutes is neither new nor unique to Ontario. In the
wake of the US Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education,82 and
subsequent legal action by the NAACP to enforce compliance, the State of Virginia went so far as to
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Saskatchewan Human Rights Code eliminated the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal and transferred its powers to
the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench. See the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2010, SS 2011, c
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See e.g. Jonathan Kay, “Human rights commissions have had their day”, National Post (6 March 2013), online:
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pass a law to suppress civil rights litigation.83 Although that law was eventually struck down by the US
Supreme Court,84 the climate of hostility to litigating civil rights never seriously abated.85
In the United States, scholars have noted that “backlash” to strong rights enforcement can generate
stiff resistance from centres of power.86 The more the enforcement of the right affects elite, majoritarian
or material interests, the more likely it is to produce resistance. The argument in the case of racial
equality and desegregation is that aggressive civil rights litigation has actually stunted progress towards
greater social equality by virtue of entrenching conservative white opinion against a perceived threat of
black empowerment through law.87 This theory holds that the emphasis in discrimination law on
dignitary rather than material interests has obscured issues of economic injustice by focusing entirely on
“stigmatic injury, stereotypes and subjective emotional harm.”88 This has led to the amplification of
“trivial” distinctions that have distracted from more critical and emerging questions of social justice.89
These distortions, produced by campaigns intended to remedy inequality, have in fact been more
beneficial to whites than blacks.90 Thus, at times when law appears to be delivering success to those
concerned with racial justice, the exact opposite may be underway.
VI. FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN RIGHTS SCEPTICISM
In Canada, political backlash to human rights, in particular on the issues of hate speech regulation
and religious accommodation, surged in the mid to late 2000s, and produced spirited public debate.91
The backlash manifested as scepticism of human rights institutions and enforcement. At the centre of the
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controversy was the 2006 publication of excerpts from America Alone,92 a polemic by right-wing pundit
Mark Steyn, in the newsmagazine Maclean’s. The book’s general theory was that “Islam” (i.e., Muslim
people) posed an existential threat to Europe. Steyn forecasted that Muslims would become a “successor
population” due to the combination of immigration and high birth rates among European Muslims. In
the result, America would have to fend for itself in a hostile, illiberal world.
Unsurprisingly, Steyn’s book outraged many Muslims, who criticized it for reproducing stereotypes
and generating unfounded fear. They accused Maclean’s of lending legitimacy and public profile in the
pages of Canada’s only national newsmagazine to views described as intolerant and xenophobic.93
Human rights cases against the publisher were filed in three different jurisdictions, apparently in
synchrony, in British Columbia, Ontario and at the federal level.94 Public coverage of the cases focused
almost entirely on the free speech defence raised by the respondent, Maclean’s, rather than on the
accusation that the newsmagazine had engaged in the prohibited conduct of promoting hate.
Newspapers, including publications known for cultural inclusiveness like the Toronto Star, called for
reforms to the human rights system lest a chill take hold on freedom of expression. The purpose of the
Code, according to the Star’s editor, was to curb “bigoted acts,” not to constrain press freedoms.95
None of the litigation was successful.96 The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) decided
that the matter was not within its jurisdiction, then proceeded to issue a written admonishment to
Maclean’s in which it recognized the importance of a free press, but expressed concern about the
media’s promotion of societal intolerance towards Muslim, Arab and South Asian Canadians.97 The
federal Canadian Human Rights Commission dismissed the complaint on June 26, 2008, without
referring it to a tribunal for a hearing.98 The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, which receives
complaints directly, conducted a hearing in June 2008 and dismissed the case on the merits in a decision
dated October 10, 2008.99
For the critics, the mere fact that human rights bodies had the power to haul writers and publishers
before adjudicators and commissions to “try” them for their ideas was not only unfair, but also a
denigration of the freedoms integral to Canadian democracy. In particular, the right to free speech was
largely posited as the ultimate “victim” of these discrimination claims. Human rights scepticism viewed
commissions and tribunals with suspicion, casting them as ominous, Big-Brother agencies that threaten
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rights rather than protect them. According to one observer writing in the conservative American
magazine, the National Review, “Canada’s human-rights tribunals are best known for penalizing critics
of Muslim fundamentalists.”100 Underlying this commentary was an “us versus them” subtext, putting
the elites who publish newspapers in the victim position (“us”) and the Muslim unknowns who brought
the litigation in the position of “aggressor” (“them”). The Canadian public easily identified with the “us”
and accordingly dismissed, or, worse, demonized the “them.”
Though it emanates from the fringe, human rights scepticism is not restricted to the libertarian
extreme. It has become common for pundits of all stripes, including liberals, to slam human rights in the
national media.101 The Pieters case in many respects presented a microcosm of a broader debate. The
OHRC intervened to support the black lawyers. A statutory institution, the OHRC has played a variety
of roles in advancing human rights in the province. Since the system overhaul of 2008, the OHRC has
focused its attention on research, policy and systemic issues. Its intervention sought to assist the Court
with the appropriate test for discrimination. It also highlighted the jurisprudential consensus concerning
anti-black racism, and the systemic factors that underlie discrimination and shape unconscious impulses.
Intervening on the opposite side was the League for Human Rights of B’nai Brith, a long-standing
Jewish service organization dedicated to “combating antisemitism, racism, and bigotry.”102 In an
unusual move, the League intervened in opposition to the black lawyers’ claim,103 arguing that the
organization was concerned about the loss of public confidence in human rights.104 The League
described itself as “a group that had worked for decades to eliminate discrimination and which
cooperated with the human rights commissions across the country,” but in recent years it had also been
the subject of an unsuccessful human rights complaint.105 As a result of its experience responding to
allegations, along with perceptions of general unfairness in the system, unjust outcomes and free speech
suppression, the League was concerned about the “erosion of public support” for human rights codes.106
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82

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

2013

It wanted the Court to refrain from inferences and presumptions of guilt, worrying that “if tribunals
allow those labels [of discrimination] to stick too easily, they will lose their meaning.”107
Indeed, the League rationalized its position by pointing to the demise of section 13 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act108 as a casualty of human rights scepticism. Section 13 prohibited speech likely to
expose identifiable vulnerable groups to hate. After lengthy and widely contested public deliberation,
the hate speech provision in the Act was repealed in 2013, at least partly because of political backlash.109
According to the League, “One of the arguments raised against s. 13 was the claim that it was too
difficult to defend a complaint; that a charge was akin to a conviction.”110 As a result, the League joined
the chorus of opposition to s. 13,111 feeling “compelled to support the law’s abolition”112 despite having
“once regarded the legislation as its best weapon against neo-Nazi hate propaganda.”113
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS GONE TOO FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH?
These episodes hint at the powerful impact of rights. The backlash to the Maclean’s case, and the
League’s resistance to Pieters, are also cautionary tales for human rights advocates. The claimants in
these cases were no doubt motivated by a desire to see justice done. Yet, such complainants risk being
treated not as genuine victims seeking redress for legal wrongs but, rather, as “those people” trying to
impose their will on “us” by co-opting the human rights process.114 Much of the public discourse around
the Maclean’s case identified with the “victim” newspaper and journalist, against the clamorous call of
law-wielding Muslims.115 Similarly, in the coverage of the Pieters case, the press highlighted Mr.
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especially in the age of digital communications. Canadian Bar Association, “Bill C-304: Canadian Human Rights Act
amendments (hate messages)”, April 2012; online: https://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/12-25-eng.pdf
League Factum, supra note 75 at para 26. That the League has itself pursued several unsuccessful human rights processes
to discredit its adversaries as “anti-Semites” apparently does not pose the same risk. For example, the League failed in its
attempt to use the City of Toronto’s anti-discrimination policy to ban the activist group Queers Against Israeli Apartheid
(QuAIA) from marching in Toronto’s Gay Pride parade. See: Andrea Houston, “Dispute panel says QuAIA can march in
Pride parade”, Daily Xtra (25 June 2012), online: <http://dailyxtra.com/toronto/news/dispute-panel-says-quaia-canmarch-in-pride-parade>.
RSC, 1985, c. H-6 [CHRA].
See generally, Charlie Gillis, “Section 13: How the battle for free speech was won”, Maclean’s (19 June 2012), online:
<http://www2.macleans.ca/2012/06/19/five-years-two-tribunals-a-raft-of-secret-hearings-a-supreme-court-challengehow-the-battle-for-free-speech-was-won/>.
League Factum, supra note 75 at para 23.
Support for repealing the section came from a notably wide range of voices on the political spectrum, including a key
report by liberal law professor Richard Moon, who recommended that s 13 be repealed due to the “limited potential of
hate speech regulation to advance equality” and the poor fit between hate speech regulation and the anti-discrimination
complaints mechanism. See Richard Moon, Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission Concerning Section 13
of the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate Speech on the Internet (October 2008), online: Social
Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865282>.
League Factum, supra note 75 at para 2.
Gillis, supra note 109.
See e.g. Leo, supra note 100.
This discourse of weaker parties using the law to wage war on established power enjoys currency in conservative circles:
Some commentators regard lawfare as an insidious tool of America's enemies, including internationalist
NGOs with an agenda to promote … [t]his easy equation of judicial processes with terrorism is startling,
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Pieters’s history of litigating racial discrimination,116 while the accused law librarian easily appeared to
be victim of both an unfair statutory regime and a presumption of guilt by an over-reaching rights
system.
Legal victory can create tangible feelings of power shifting, for those on both sides. For members of
minority groups, a legal victory can be an exhilarating vindication amid a general climate of racial
animus and societal complicity that rarely affirms those members’ lived experiences with inequality.117
It can also galvanize social and political action through coalition building and solidarity.118 Williams
describes moments of rights affirmation as “islands of empowerment.”119 For her, “[r]ights contain
images of power, and manipulating those images, either visually or linguistically, is central in the
making and maintenance of rights… . [T]he more dizzyingly diverse the images that are propagated, the
more empowered we will be as a society.”120 Rights claimants experience a sense of power when they
reconstruct the images before the law, from stereotype to truth. A successful human rights decision, like
Pieters, can do that.
But the value of rights vindication must be assessed in the overall context of social and political
conditions. The theory of backlash suggests that strong legal victory will come with political
consequences that can be regressive for the broader social justice goal. While democracy welcomes
spirited public debate, human rights are, at their core, counter-majoritarian and are often at risk of being
perceived as “anti-democratic”. This can make the tension between what rights protection requires and
what liberal-democratic institutions are prepared to do particularly acute.
VIII. DELIBERATION AND PERSUASION
Structural realities dictate that material interests will affect the content and manner of any debate,
including about human rights. Thus, the spaces of public deliberation about rights provide imperfect, but
useful, avenues for a society to grapple with difficult questions. Moments of polarized public debate
about a contentious issue can in fact signal an impending seismic attitudinal shift that may yield tangible
progress.121 In international studies, scholars have noted that a combination of rules enforcement,
argumentation and persuasion can operate to indigenize international human rights norms that may
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David Luban, “Lawfare and Legal Ethics at Guantanomo” (2008) 60 Stanford L Rev 1981 at 2020-2021 [emphasis
added].
See “National Post editorial board: Real court,” supra note 81 (referring to Pieters’s legal challenge to the standardized
law school admission test more than 10 years earlier on the basis that it is racially discriminatory).
There is a rich history of members of minority groups in Canada using the courts to challenge discrimination in a variety
of areas. See James W St G Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case
Studies (Waterloo: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).
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Ibid.
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [Describing the steps to “socializing” human rights norms].
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previously have been resisted in localized contexts.122 The first step to socializing human rights norms is
forced imposition and strategic bargaining, which is necessary to implant positive human rightsrespecting laws, even if their enforcement is unlikely and the state’s commitment to them is tenuous.123
The second step is institutionalization, which is the operationalizing stage that flows from the changes
implemented at the first step. Note that institutionalization of human rights norms under this model
comes before the content of those norms is finally determined and embedded. Substantive details come
about through an ultimate process of argumentation and persuasion. This is where the state and citizens
engage in debate about contentious issues, with a view to reaching a public consensus. Under this
conception, rights defenders must also engage competitively in the public marketplace of ideas, where
the content of “rights” is up for negotiation. The process requires an attitude of openness to persuasion,
and also to compromise. According to the theory, through this deliberative process human rights norms
become thoroughly socialized.124
The international socialization model is not a perfect fit for evaluating what backlash means in
domestic human rights enforcement, but it does offer some insight to interpreting the socio-political
impact of strong rights decisions. It lends support to the suggestion that what is called “backlash” might
actually be a foreseeable, even constructive, dynamic. High-pitch public contestation may in fact mark a
transition from a stage of rights institutionalization to one of argumentation and persuasion, which if
successful can lead to a new and stable public consensus.
In all of the cases examined in this article—RDS, Nassiah, Pieters and Maclean’s—the claimants
compelled the kind of moment Williams might describe as turning “rhetorical truth” into a “rhetorical
gesture” in order to create space for the possibility of an alternative, more inclusive and more truthful
“truth”. The forum created by the human rights system (or court) provided a structure for asserting each
claim. Regardless of the substantive result, these spaces can be seen as “islands of empowerment” for
those individuals whose lives are shaped and affected in various ways by racism.125 The claims speak
122

123
124
125
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stereotypes today]; Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial
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232 [concluding that “Muslims and, in particular, Arab Muslims, are, with Blacks, the group most affected by various
forms of discrimination” in Quebec]; Amnesty International, “Matching International Commitments with National
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truths in and of themselves. This is where the power of such claims reside, but also from where the
impulse to backlash emerges. The member of a racialized group who makes a claim of discrimination
without anything short of a smoking gun may be viewed as an agitator, even an aggressor, who turns
others into victims by unleashing human rights upon them.
This defensive response to allegations of discrimination grows out of an unfounded and illogical
assumption that most people hold non-discriminatory attitudes. While the legal system imposes the
burden of proof on the one who alleges a wrong, nobody is expected to “prove” the background facts,
including the “backdrop of hidden, contestable assumptions about which we could never function, but
which necessarily predetermine in large measure, the results reached.”126 There is, therefore, no logical
reason for adjudicators to begin from a factually suspect starting point of race-neutrality, especially in
the human rights context, where liability is not contingent upon intent or state of mind. Fact-finders do
not necessarily abandon the requirement that the applicant meet the “more likely than not” burden of
proof applicable in discrimination cases when they ask, as the HRTO did in Pieters, for an explanation
from the respondent about their state of mind and conduct. Until courts and tribunals move away from
assuming incorrect background facts, adjudication will almost always begin from the false presumption
of a race-neutral society.127 Cases like Pieters transform these presumptions and compel future decision
makers to consider race when it is relevant, and to take notice of the background social fact of systemic
racism. Perhaps by naming unwitting discriminators, like the unremitting law librarian, human rights
law can hope to serve as an unconscious, if not conscious, deterrent.
It is, at the same time, quite important not to overstate the backlash phenomenon or its
implications.128 In the US, backlash theories were tempered almost as soon as they were tested.
American backlash theorists, who mostly wrote about failures in implementing racial equality as
prescribed by Brown, reached the opposite conclusion when they assessed the movement towards gay
rights.129 Recent research suggests that, contrary to initial concern about resistance to early gay rights
litigation, it appears that public opinion towards acceptance of gay marriage actually accelerated during
the period of backlash.130 On abortion, it has recently been shown that political realignment, not
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Carle, supra note 26 at 194. Carle challenges the theory that the risk of backlash requires scepticism about rights
litigation:
The descriptive conclusion that no good has been achieved as the result of prior efforts at social reform
produces the normative conclusion that nothing ought to be tried, because such efforts never produce
improvements, and may produce a worse state of affairs than originally existed. Such broad
conclusions lead to a state of apathy or resignation worse than a failed experiment.
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backlash to litigation, better explains the timing and shape of political polarization around that issue in
the United States.131
In Canada, the Maclean’s issues arguably attracted disproportionate media attention because the press
was directly affected. Almost every major media publication in the country expressed concern about
protecting press freedom from human rights. The fact that large segments of the public identified with
the issue does not necessarily suggest that the public were concerned about the issue prior to it being
prioritized by the self-interested media. In Pieters, there was far less coverage of the case, and minimal
backlash. In Ontario, Tim Hudak won the Conservative Party leadership in 2009 on the energy of human
rights scepticism, committing himself to abolishing the HRTO, which he once called a “kangaroo
court.”132 When federal Conservative MP Brian Storseth introduced the private member’s bill to repeal
s. 13 of the CHRA, he described the federal tribunal with surprising contempt as “a quasi-judicial,
secretive body that takes away your natural rights as a Canadian.”133 In Ontario, Tim Hudak’s
subsequent reversal of his promise to abolish the HRTO suggests that he may have over-played the hand
of human rights scepticism. It also suggests that, despite intense public contestation about form and
content, human rights may be sufficiently entrenched in the social fabric of Ontario to forestall any
political threat of legislative repeal. At the federal level, the call for human rights reform halted at the
repeal of the hate speech provision, while the core anti-discrimination protections remain in force.
Indeed, for better or worse, human rights remain an integral part of the legal and institutional
framework. More importantly, human rights language has been normalized and basic principles have
been embedded in general best practices in employment, services, contracts and housing. While it may
once have been acceptable, even encouraged, to openly crack jokes or utter slurs about people of various
ethnicities, or to use sexual humour and innuendo, such behaviour is now widely condemned in
regulated spaces, and prohibitions are often enforced with consequences. This culture shift has occurred
at least in part due to the existence of human rights law and institutions.
IX. CONCLUSION
Under Ontario’s direct access tribunal model, which launched in 2008, virtually anyone can lodge a
claim and compel almost anyone else to respond to allegations of discrimination. Frequent respondents
in human rights cases include small-business owners, independent professionals, low- and mid-level
managers and public-service workers. Such individuals exercise some degree of situational power
advantages in a particular setting (e.g., as an employee’s supervisor or frontline service provider), but
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they are mostly people just like anybody else. Such individuals, when accused of discrimination, feel
oppressed by human rights. This is a cost to consider, but should be viewed in the broader context of
increasing access to justice and promoting the aspirations of the Code.
In the final analysis, exposing hard-working, middle-class, decent individuals as unwitting
discriminators will not cure society of its structural ills. Whatever resolution a human rights case may
deliver to a successful applicant, there remains little debate that litigation alone cannot solve social
problems; at best, it fixes (parts of) an individual’s experience of injury, and mitigates (some of) the
harms caused by social disadvantage. The types of social problems that are not substantially affected by
human rights litigation include negative attitudes, values, culture and the economic order. Cultural shifts
occur within society, often detached from or despite the law. Political engagement and persuasion can
achieve more by way of attitude shifting than can strong rights adjudication.134 Meanwhile, the
foundational arrangements around resource and wealth distribution will not be significantly impacted or
altered by human rights litigation. Indeed, human rights operate within political, legal and institutional
constraints that define the scope of possible transformation. Without a re-ordering of social and
economic foundations, inequality of some form is likely to remain an essential feature of Canadian race
relations. A liberal reform mechanism, such as anti-discrimination law, can provide at best a mitigating
outlet to offset the harms caused by underlying conditions that are bound up in the production and
perpetuation of systemic inequality.
If human rights litigation is not capable of producing significant systemic change or social
transformation, what value do human rights bring to the question of racial emancipation? Cases like
Pieters provide moments to reflect and acknowledge the truth of lived experiences with race and power.
They offer the occasion to appropriate rhetorical frames, and to layer subjectivities in order to affirm the
racialized experiences with the law that are too often muted by established norms of legal process. The
debate about whether adjudication is the best avenue for rights definition and redress will no doubt
continue. The idea that rights provide the possibility of “islands of empowerment” is better than losing
hope or seeking solace in failure. Cases like Pieters and Maclean’s demonstrate that members of
structurally disadvantaged groups can access the justice system and compel engagement by more
powerful actors, even if achieving systemic racial equality remains a more distant goal.
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